A study on diagnosability of space station ECLSS by Sztipanovits, J. et al.
N9O-27294
A Study on Diagnosabilit y of Space Station ECLSS
S. Padalkar, W. Blokland, and J. Sztipanovits
Vanderbilt University. Nashville, TN.
ABSTRACT
This research demonstrates the use of the Multigraph Architecture (MGA) for studies on the Environment
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). The objective of this effort has been the following: (1) to create
an updated set of models of the Potable Water Subsystem (PWS) by using the graphical model building
tools of the Multigraph Programming Environment (MPE), (2) to derive a real-time alarm simulator from
the models, and (3) to demonstrate the effects of sensor allocation on the diagnosability of the PWS. This
work may serve as a preliminary study for the detailed analysis of the sensor allocation and diagnosability
problems in the ECLSS.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Real-time monitoring and diagnostics is a necessary component of critical and complex systems such as
ECLSS. Their task is to provide an extensive fault detection capability combined with diagnostics of reason-
able depth. The function of ECLSS requires the diagnostic system to operate continuously in a dynamically
changing environment. Diagnostic hypotheses must be generated in an evolving fault scenario so as to allow
corrective measures that can prevent the development of catastrophic failures.
Construction of real-time diagnostic systems is not straightforward. The diagnostic reasoning is subject
to time constraints, has to indicate modeling errors, and must be robust enough to handle sensor failures.
In dynamic systems where the presence of feedback loops are inevitable, the diagnostic system must apply
temporal reasoning. These and similar requirements make the application of "associative" approaches - that
associate patterns of observations (symptoms) with the underlying causes - unfeasible [1].
Model-based approaches have the potential of solving the challenging problems of real-time diagnostics.
Core components of model-based diagnostic systems are: (1) well defined model of the system to be diagnosed,
and (2) diagnostic reasoning algorithm, which interprets the observations in the context of the model. The
purpose of the observations is to detect anomalies in the system behavior. Fault detection algorithms use
the incoming data from sensors that are allocated in the plant and process them to check whether various
operational constraints are satisfied.
Performance of a particular diagnostic system depends on the number and reliability of sensors providing
input data for the fault detection system. Itaving a large number of reliable sensors "close" to the possible
fault sources makes the diagnostic reasoning simple and the result accurate. The obvious limitation in
improving the diagnostic performance by increasing the number of sensors is cost. Sensors are usually scarce
resources that have to be carefully allocated. A realistic design approach can not be based on the unlimited
availability of these resources. On the contrary, the question is how to allocate a limited number of sensors
of limited reliability so as to achieve the best diagnostic resolution?
The objectives of this study have been to create models for the fault diagnostic system of PWS, to use
the models for simulating real-time alarm sequences, and to demonstrate the relationship between sensor
allocation and diagnostic resolution.
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MULTIGRAPH ARCHITECTURE
Over the last five years Vanderbilt has developed a technology for the design and implementation of model-
based real-time systems. The basic principles used in the construction of the Multigraph Architecture (MGA)
are the followings:
Model-based systems include: (1) multiple-aspect models of the system to be monitored, controlled,
and diagnosed, (2) models of the components of the monitoring, control, and diagnostic system itself,
and (3) models of their interaction.
• The models form a new level of abstraction in the system architecture, and are actively involved in the
system operation.
Driven by the external events that are received by the system, tile models are continuously inter-
preted and reinterpreted. Interpretation of the models of the monitoring/control/diagnostic system
components generates their actual implementation on a lower level. The lower level implementations
determine the actual behavior of the system at a given time. Therefore, a model-based system can
dynamically change its behavior if the state of the model changes on a higher level. This is one of the
ultimate advantages of the model-based approach. It provides a very high-level of flexibility in a very
simple manner.
Most of the complexity of the model-based system is concentrated on the models. The rest of the
system is a set of very generic, highly "reusable" procedural code providing the run-time support for
the system. Due to this, the development technology of model-based systems can be supported by
extremely efficient graphical model building, and automatic model verification tools.
The Multigraph Architecture (MGA) includes two main components, a graphic programming environ-
ment (Multigraph Programming Environment, MPE) [2] and a parallel execution environment (Multigraph
Execution Environment, MEE) [3]. MPE facilitates building and maintaining multiple-aspect models of het-
erogeneous systems. The iconic graphic editors of MPE represent models in the form of graphic pictures and
generate their symbolic representation in terms of specific declarative languages. MEE is a macro-dataflow
model, which provides a unified environment for the execution of the functional components of model-based
systems. Important feature of the Multigraph technology is that executable systems are automatically gen-
erated from the models, providing very high level software productivity.
MODELING TECHNIQUE
Any complex electro-mechanical system such as the ECLSS can be viewed from many different aspects. One
such aspect is its function, another is its structure. A hierarchical decomposition of the functional aspect
vield_ the llierarchical Functional Model (HFM). Similarly, a hierarchical decomposilion of the s_.ructural
aspect yields the Hierarchical Component Model (IICM). The Ilierarchical Fault Model (HFaM) is derived
in th__ context of the IIFM and the ItCM.
Hierarchical Functional Model
The individual nodes in the HFM are referred to as processes. A process in the HFM can be thought of
as an abstract entity that performs a specific function. It is possible to model certain viewpoints of every
process. They are the structural viewpoint and the failure propagation viewpoint.
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Structural Viewpoint
The structural viewpoint of a process represents information about its internal structure. The following
items are acquired for each process:
• Input/Output Process Variables,
• Process States,
• Alarms, and
• Subpro cesses.
Failure Propagation Viewpoint
While performing its function, a process may violate some of its functional constraints due to the presence
of faults. When such a violation occurs, the process is said to contain a failure-mode. The presence of a
failure-mode can be detected by an alarm derived from a sensor associated with the process. A process can
exist in a number of different states. The following items are acquired for each process:
Failure-mo des.
Failure-mode Alarm associations. Each failure-mode alarm association has associated with itself,
the list of process states in which it is active.
A fault propagation graph (FPG). The FPG of a process denotes a causal relationship between its
failure-modes and the failure-modes of its subprocesses. Each causal link in the FPG originates from
a failure-mode of a subprocess and propagates to a failure-mode of either a subprocess or the parent.
A causal link is weighted by four parameters, the fault propagation probability, the minimum fault
propagation time, the maximum fault propagation time, and the list of process states in which the
link is active. An AND type of causal link is also permitted in the FPG. This link has as ancestors,
more than one subprocess failure-mode, and as destination more than one subprocess failure-mode
and/or parent failure-mode. In case of the AND type of causal link, the fault propagation probability
implies the probability of occurrence of the destination failure-too des after all the ancestor failure-mo des
have occurred. Similarly, the minimum and maximum fault propagation times are the minimum and
maximum times during which the destination failure-modes will occur after all ancestor failure-modes
have occurred.
Hierarchical Component Model
A component in the HCM is an actual piece of hardware that can assist a variety of processes in performing
their functions. The source of faults in a system are any of the components in the HCM. Each component
upon becoming faulty, can exhibit a number of failed-states. The following items are acquired for each
component:
• Component failed-states and
• Subcomponents.
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Function-Comp onent Interactions
A failed-state in a component can lead to a number failure-modes being present in some of the processes in
the HFM. The set of causal relationships between the failed-states of the components, and the failure-modes
of the processes, is acquired. A causal link is weighted by three parameters, the fault propagation probability,
the minimum fault propagation time, and the maximum fault propagation time.
Hierarchical Fault Model
The fault model of a process is the fault propagation viewpoint of the process model, and the set of causal
links between the component failed-states and the process' failure-mo des and failure-mo des of all the process'
existing subprocesses. The HFaM is the collection of all such process fault models. An example of a process
fault model is shown in Figure 1.
REASONING TECHNIQUE
The occurrence of a fault in the system implies that a component or a set of components exhibit failed-states.
The existence of failed-states leads to the existence of failure-modes in some processes. Among the set of
existing failure-modes, those with associated alarms are detected by the ringing of those alarms. These
ringing alarms start the diagnostic activity. The diagnostic reasoning technique selects the highest process
in the HFM containing ringing alarrns, and runs a Faulty Component Identification Algorithm (FC]A) on
the fault model of the process' parent. The FCIA back-propagates along the ringing alarm failure-modes,
and using structural and temporal constraints, identifies a set of possible fault source components [4]. The
FCIA is guaranteed to produce a result in real-time because it possesses a polynomial time complexity. This
time complexity is O(n3), where n is the number of existing failure-modes in the FPG of that process.
Certain factors affect the number of fault source candidates identified by the FCIA. A single fault ease is
where one component is responsible for the failures in the system. If a single fault case is identified by the
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Figure 2: PWS Component Hierarchy
FCIA, the number of identified fault source candidates depends on the fault model. The primary factor is
the number and allocation of alarms to failure-mo des in the FPG. Since alarms are derived from sensors, the
number of sensors allocated for diagnostic purposes affects the diagnostic result. If the number of sensors is
low, then the number of identified fault source candidates can be high. On the other hand, if the the number
of sensors are sufficient and are allocated to the right failure-modes in a FPG, the number of identified fault
source candidates in a single fault ease can be one. The other factor affecting the number of identified fault
source candidates is the internal structure, i.e. the FPG and the component failure-mode associations, of
the fault model of each process in the HFM.
PWS MODELS
The Potable Water System (PWS) of the ECLSS is decomposed from its structural aspect, resulting in a
component hierarchy [5] shown m Figure 2. It is also decomposed in its functional aspect, resulting in a
function hierarchy [5] shown in Figure 3.
SYSTEM DIAGNOSABILITY
Designers of modern industrial and space systems would like to use a lesser number of sensors for diagnostic
purposes, in order to reduce costs. This is especially true in space systems because the total weight as well
the total cost of sensors has to be reduced. Before they decide to eliminate a sensor, they would like to know
the effects of its removal on tile diagnostic result. Hence an approach that sludies the diagnosability of a
system given a particular sensor allocation is very useful to space system designers.
Some of the important terms in diagnosability studies are provided.
• Sensor Allocation: The number of sensors in the system, and tile places in the system where they
have been installed.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Figure 3: PWS Function Hierarchy
• Diagnostic Result: The set of fault source components diagnosed under no time constraints.
• Time Constrained Diagnostic Result: The set of fault source components diagnosed within a
specific time constraint.
• Single Component Diagnosability: The diagnostic result when the single component in question
is the fault source.
• Multiple Component Diagnosability: The diagnostic result when the specified multiple compo-
nents are the set of fault source components.
• Unique Diagnosability: The diagnostic result is the same as the set of actual fault source compo-
nents. In single fault ca:_es the number of cornponents in the diagnostic resu]', and the actua! set of
fault source components is equal to one.
The single component diagnosability, multiple component diagnosability, and unique diagnosability defi-
nitions can be extended to include the case of time constrained diagnostic result.
Diagnosabilit y Studies
A variety of studies can be performed on the system in order to determine its diagnosability. Given a
particular sensor allocation, the diagnosahilit y of components can be obtained. By eliminating a sensor from
the allocation, the differences in the diagnosability of components can be determined. If the differences are
minimal the designer has the option of eliminating that sensor. Finally, a study can be performed to find an
optimal sensor allocation that provides unique diagnosability.
Simulation Method
The simulation method is used to demonstrate some aspects of the diagnosability studies. This method
involved developing a fault simulator that simulates actual fault scenarios. The fault model of the system,
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whichincludesthesensorallocation,servesastheinternaldatabaseforthesimulator.Thisinternaldatabase
isautomaticallygenerateduringthediagnosticruntimesystemgenerationphaseby thediagnosticnter-
pretor.Thesimulatoris stand-aloneprogramthat canacceptasinput,a setof fault sourcecomponents
with their selectedfailed-states.Thepatternof ensuingalarms is derived, and is simulated in real-time.
This real-time alarm pattern serves as the input to the diagnostic process. A diagnostic result is generated
on receipt of the simulated alarm pattern.
The diagnosability of any component can now be observed for any given sensor allocation. For a given
sensor allocation, the fault scenario or the real-time alarm pattern with the component under question being
the fault source is obtained. This real-time alarm pattern serves as the input for the diagnostic process. The
generated diagnostic result is stored and compared with the diagnostic results from other sensor allocations.
The effects of different sensor allocations on the diagnosability of a component can be studied in this manner.
Another use of such a simulator is to study the effects of adding or removing a sensor on the diagnostic
process. Initially the designer can select a sensor of interest. The simulator determines all the components
that are affected by the presence and absence of this sensor. Two fault simulations are generated for each
of the affected components, one with the sensor being present and the other with the sensor being absent.
The diagnosability of each component in both cases is determined on the basis of the two simulations. A
statistical measure based on the diagnotic results, can then be used to determine whether or not the sensor
should be retained in the system.
The simulation method is an effective first step in demonstrating the need for and effectiveness of diag-
nosability studies. It is quite effective in determining the diagnosability of a component. It sometimes proves
useful in helping a designer decide whether to retain a sensor in the system or not. However, the process of
finding the diagnostic result for all components before and after the removal of a particular sensor is very
cumbersome and time consuming. The same process has to be repeated for any other sensor allocation. If
the designer wants to determine an optimal sensor allocation that will achieve unique diagnosability in single
fault cases, he/she has to simulate all possible sensor allocations before finding the answer. This process
has an exponential time complexity because the number of possible sensor allocations can be O(2'_), where
n is the total number of failure-modes in the system. This complexity is clearly unacceptable for large-scale
systems. An analytical method of a more manageable time complexity is definitely required for solving the
problems of system diagnosability.
PWS DIAGNOSABILITY STUDY
An example that presents the effects on system diagnosability when a sensor is removed, is presented. The
relevant portions of the fault model of the chosen process, Absorption-of-P articles is shown in Figure 4.
Initial Sensor Allocation
The sensor allocation for the failure-modes of the Absorption-of-Particles process and the failure-modes of
its subt,rocesses follows:
• Sensor Allocation in Subprocess Phase-1.
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor SO, Alarm A0. slow-bad-absorption: Sensor S1, Alarm A1. reverse-
absorption: Sensor $2, Alarm A2.
• Sensor Allocation in Subprocess Phase-2
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor $3, Alarm A3. slow-bad-absorption: Sensor $4, Alarm A4. reverse-
absorption: Sensor $5, Alarm A5.
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iFigure 4: Absorption-of-Particles fault model
• Sensor Allocation in Process Absorption-of-Particles.
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor $6, Alarm A6. slow-bad-absorption:
Sensor $8, Alarm A8.
Sensor $7, Alarm A7. bad-flow:
The single component diagnosability for the two associated components when only one failed-state is
simulated at a time is:
• Absorption Bed 1:
Heat Damaged: Absorption Bed 1 Heat Damaged. Loaded: Absorption Bed 1 Loaded. Perforated:
Absorption Bed 1 Perforated. Clogged: Absorption Bed 1 Clogged and Absorption Bed 2 Clogged.
• Absorption Bed 2:
Heat Damaged: Absorption Bed 2 Heat. Damaged. Loaded: Absorption Bed 2 Loaded. Perforated:
Absorption Bed 2 Perforated. CIo99ed: Absorption Bed 2 Clogged and Absorption Bed 1 Clogged.
The explanation of the diagnostic result is provided for the cases of absorption bed 1 and 2 being in the
heat damaged failed state. If the absorption bed 1 is heat damaged, the alarms generated by the simulation
in order are: A2, AS, A6. The alarm A2 is associated with failure-mode reverse-absorption in the phase-1
process. There exists a failure-propagation link from this failure-mode to the reverse-absorption failure-
mode in the phase-2 process. Alarm A5 is associated with the reverse-absorption failure-mode in the phase-2
process. There exists a failure-propagation link from this failure-mode to the sudden-bad-absorption failure-
mode in the Absorption-of-P articles process. Alarm A6 is associated with the sudden-bad-absorption failure-
mode in the Absorption-of-Particles process. The FCIA decides that alarm A2 is the primary alarm since
this alarm could have caused alarms A5 and A6. The ancestor components of the failure-mode associated
with the primary alarm are the initial set fault source hypothesis. In this case it is absorption bed 1 in heat
damaged failed state. After ascertaining the fact that if absorption bed 1 was heat damaged the times at
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whichalarms A2, AS, and A6 could have been generated are not in conflict with the actual generation times,
the absorption bed 1 in heat damaged state is returned by the FCIA as the diagnostic result.
If absorption bed 2 is heat damaged, the alarms generated by the simulation in order are: AS, A6.
The FCIA decides that alarm A5 is the primary alarm. The possible ancestor components of the failure-
mode associated with this alarm are absorption bed 1 being heat damaged and absorption bed 2 being heat
damaged. However, if absorption bed 1 was heat damaged, alarm A2 would have been generated. Since
this did not happen, absorption bed 1 being heat damaged is removed from the list of identified fault source
components. Therefore, the final diagnostic result is absorption bed 2 being heat damaged.
Final Sensor Allocation
The sensor $2 associated with alarm A2 and attached to failure-mode reverse-absorption in the phase-1
process is removed. The resultant sensor allocation follows:
• Sensor Allocation in Subprocess Phase-1.
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor SO, Alarm A0. slow-bad-absorption: Sensor S1, Alarm A1. reverse-
absorption: No sensor.
• Sensor Allocation in Subprocess Phase-2
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor $3, Alarm A3. slow-bad-absorption: Sensor $4, Alarm A4. reverse-
absorption: Sensor $5, Alarm A5.
• Sensor Allocation in Process Absorption-of-P articles.
sudden-bad-absorption: Sensor $6, Alarm A6. slow-bad-absorption: Sensor $7, Alarm A7. bad-flow:
Sensor $8, Alarm AS.
The single component diagnosability for the two associated components is when only one failed-state is
simulated at a time is:
5.
Absorption Bed I:
Heat Damaged: Absorption Bed 1 Heat Damaged and Absorption Bed 2 Heat Damaged. Loaded:
Absorption Bed 1 Loade<!. Perforated: Absorption Bed 1 Perforated. Clogged: Absorption Bed 1
Clogged and Absorption Bed 2 Clogged.
• Absorption Bed e:
Heat Damaged: Absorption Bed 2 Iteat Damaged and Absorption Bed 1 Heat Damaged. Loaded:
Absorption Bed 2 Loaded. Perforated: Absorption Bed 2 Perforated. Clogged: Absorption Bed 2
Clogged and Absorption Bed 1 Clogged.
A graphical tabulation of the diagnosability results in both cases of sensor allocation is shown in Figure
The explanation of the diagnostic result is provided for the cases of absorption bed 1 and 2 being in the
heat damaged failed state. The sensor $2 has been removed, therefore alarm A2 no longer exists, and the
failure-mo de reverse-absorption in the phase-1 process has no associated alarm. If either the absorption bed
1 or the absorption bed 2 was heat damaged, the alarms generated by the simulation in order are: A5, A6.
The alarm A5 is diagnosed as the primary alarm. The ancestor componel_ts of this alarm are absorption
bed 1 being heat damaged and absorption bed 2 being heat damaged. Since there is no alarm A2 in the
fault model, the hypothesis absorption bed 1 being heat damaged has to retained. Hence if either of the two
components is the fault source, the diagnostic resul! contains both of them.
173
D_Jcrott_
ke_url
2
Initial Sensor Allocation
DJa£nosh¢
_¢Ful_
Con,_¢;p¢_t
Final Sensor Allocation
Figure 5: Diagnosability results
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